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The gender gap of returns on education
across West European countries
Concetta Mendolicchio (IAB)
Thomas Rhein (IAB)
Mit der Reihe „IAB-Discussion Paper“ will das Forschungsinstitut der Bundesagentur für
Arbeit den Dialog mit der externen Wissenschaft intensivieren. Durch die rasche Verbreitung
von Forschungsergebnissen über das Internet soll noch vor Drucklegung Kritik angeregt und
Qualität gesichert werden.
The “IAB-Discussion Paper” is published by the research institute of the German Federal
Employment Agency in order to intensify the dialogue with the scientific community. The
prompt publication of the latest research results via the internet intends to stimulate criticism
and to ensure research quality at an early stage before printing.
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Abstract
We study the returns on education in Europe in a comparative perspective. We ex-
tend the model of de la Fuente [(2003). Human Capital in a Global and Knowledge-
based Economy. part II: Assessment at the EU Country Level. Report for the Euro-
pean Commission], by estimating the values of the relevant parameters for men and
women and introducing several variables specifically related to maternity leaves and
benefits. As a preliminary step, we evaluate the effect of education on the wage pro-
file. We estimate the Mincerian coefficients for 12 West European countries using
the EU-SILC data for 2007 and use them as input in the optimisation problem of the
individual to calibrate the model. Finally, we analyse the impact and relevance of
several public policy variables. In particular, we evaluate the elasticities of the re-
turns to education with respect to unemployment benefits, marginal and average tax
rates, maternity leave and childcare benefits.
Zusammenfassung
Wir untersuchen die Bildungserträge in Europa in vergleichender Perspektive. Wir
erweitern dazu das Modell von de la Fuente [(2003). Human Capital in a Global and
Knowledge-based Economy. part II: Assessment at the EU Country Level. Report
for the European Commission], indem wir die relevanten Parameter für Männer und
Frauen schätzen und einige Variablen für staatliche Leistungen bei Eltern- oder Er-
ziehungsurlaub und für Kinderbetreuung einführen. Daneben untersuchen wir den
Einfluss der Bildung auf das Lohnprofil. Wir schätzen die Mincer-Koeffizienten für 12
westeuropäische Länder mit den EU-SILC-Daten für 2007 und nutzen sie als Input
zur Kalibrierung eines Modells des Optimierungsproblem eines Individuums.
Schließlich analysieren wir die Auswirkung und Relevanz verschiedener Politikbe-
reiche. Insbesondere schätzen wir die Elastizitäten der Bildungserträge im Hinblick
auf Änderungen der Arbeitslosenunterstützung, der marginalen und durchschnittli-
chen Steuersätze und Leistungen bei Mutterschaft und für Kinderbetreuung.
JEL classification: I21
Keywords: human capital, rate of return, public policy
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1 Introduction
In the economic literature, human capital accumulation has been identified as one of
the most relevant engines of economic growth. Also, changes in the skill premium
have often been identified as an important factor affecting the dynamics of income
distribution. Moreover, human capital and, first and foremost, the level of formal
education have frequently been seen as one of the most important factors affecting
many dimensions of social life, including the structure and dynamics of the family
and fertility patterns. These are some of the motivations behind the large literature
studying levels and dynamics of the returns on education. In this paper, we contrib-
ute to this literature by providing some additional evidence on the returns to educa-
tion in several European countries. Our contribution has four distinctive features.
First, we compute the rates of return using a well-specified theoretical model of indi-
vidual choice, which allows us to take into account and to assess the significance of
some of the different relevant variables: the wage premium, the structure of income
tax and of some public transfers and benefits, and the costs of the investments in
education. Secondly, we provide separate results for men and women. Thirdly, we
estimate the wage premia using EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions data
(2007), which improve upon the quality of the data previously available for a com-
parative analysis at European level. Finally, we consider 12 different EU countries,
spanning quite different situations in terms of labour market conditions and public
policies.
Concerning the first point, several papers compute the rate of returns on education
embedding the wage premia in models, taking into account some of the other rele-
vant variables (see, for instance, Barceinas-Paredes, Oliver-Alonso, Raymond-Bara,
Roig-Sabaté and Weber (2000), Blondal, Field and Girouard (2002), and Heckman,
Lochner and Todd (2008)). Our theoretical model builds on that proposed by de la
Fuente (2003) and de la Fuente and Jimeno (2008). The first report (2003), written
on behalf of the European Commission, provides a comparative analysis of private
and social returns on education in 14 European countries. It specifies the investment
in education as the optimal solution to a well-defined individual optimisation problem
which takes into account wage premium, labour income taxes, costs of education
and incidence of unemployment – at different educational levels – and unemploy-
ment benefits. The report uses different sets of data to compute the returns on edu-
cation across European countries. The main findings are that educational attain-
ments are a key determinant of individual earnings and aggregate productivity and
that human capital is an attractive investment from both the microeconomic and the
macroeconomic points of view. The same basic model has also been adopted in
several country studies (see de la Croix and Vanderberghe (2004) for Belgium, Cic-
cone (2004) for Italy and de la Fuente, Jimeno and Domenech (2003) for Spain).
More recently, de la Fuente and Jimeno (2008) focus on the fiscal returns to educa-
tion in European countries and, using different simulated scenarios, evaluate the
impact of several public policies. All these papers provide gender-free estimates.
Conversely, we compute separately the returns on education of men and women
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entering the job market at the end of their formal education and exiting the job mar-
ket at the average age of retirement. The obvious motivation for this disaggregation
by gender is that the lifetime experiences of men and women differ for many rea-
sons. For instance, the wage profiles of men and women are different; the gender-
specific rates of unemployment are different; the length of their active lives are dif-
ferent; unemployment benefits are (or may be) different, due (mostly) to wage differ-
ences; public policies affect men and women in different ways. Gender-specific re-
turns on education have been computed, using de la Fuente's model, for 21 OECD
countries by Boarini and Strauss (2010). We also adopt his 2003 model to estimate
the returns on education for men. However, to study all the possible factors driving
the gender gap in the rates of return, we take the de la Fuente model one step fur-
ther by also considering some parameters related to maternity issues that can affect
the incentive to invest in education and to participate to the labour market for women
(see Del Boca, Locatelli, Pasqua and Pronzato (2003)). Hence, our model differs
from that of Boarini and Strauss (2010) mainly in how it deals with women (and for
the econometric procedure adopted in the estimate of the Mincerian coefficients that
they use). The actual female work experience may be affected by maternity epi-
sodes and, consequently, by maternity leave and maternity-related monetary bene-
fits (Mac (2003), Mahon (2002), Brewster and Rindfuss (2000), Blackburn, Bloom
and Neumark (1993)). Therefore, maternity accounts for several differences in the
working lives of men and women. Potentially, it also has some consequences re-
lated to the female-specific rates of return because of the correlation that may exist
between education and fertility. The (negative) relationship between these two vari-
ables is often taken for granted. While there are many studies on this subject (and
corroborating this claim) referring to developing countries, there seems to be rela-
tively little empirical evidence on this issue in economically advanced countries in a
comparative perspective. Unfortunately, the EU-SILC data do not provide the infor-
mation required to compute the fertility rates directly.1 Using evidence from a non-
homogeneous source that can adopt different definitions, actual vs. expected fertility
rates, may introduce measurement errors and bias. Hence, in this paper, unlike with
standard macro-estimations, we exploit some evidence based on the UNCE “Family
and Fertility Studies” referring to several European countries to evaluate the rela-
tionship between education and fertility. These reports provide, on a comparable
basis, information on fertility rates, broken down by education levels and, thus, they
provide one of the main ingredients for the estimates. It turns out that, indeed, there
is a negative correlation between education and fertility.
One of the key building blocks for our analysis is the estimates of the wage premia.
The EU-SILC data give us the opportunity to use recent and comparable micro-data
to estimate the cross-country differences in the returns on education. We will dis-
1 The data only report the total number of children in the household. In the literature, many
references are to Jones (1982) and, somewhat improperly, to the United Nations (1995, a
study just referring to developing countries).
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cuss the data in more detail in Section 3. Using the EU-SILC data (2007), we esti-
mate the Mincerian coefficients (Mincer (1974)) for the 12 countries in our sample,
separately for men and women. We then embed these as one parameter affecting
the individual decision problem, together with several other parameters.
Different policies affect the decision of investing in education in many different ways
(see de la Croix, D. and Doepke, M. (2004), Gustafsson, S., Kenjoh, E. and Wet-
zels, C. (2002)). In general, a comparative analysis taking into account countries
with different systems of policy intervention is interesting. We believe that the com-
parative perspective is particularly useful for dealing with gender-related differences
in returns on education because the work experiences of women vary across coun-
tries more than those of men.
In addition to our estimates of the Mincerian coefficients, we present our computa-
tions of the rates of return and of their elasticities with respect to several policy pa-
rameters. They show that, quantitatively, the returns on education depend crucially
on the Mincerian components (i.e. wage premia and labour income taxes). Since the
unemployment rates by educational levels are different, unemployment benefits also
affect the rates of return on education. Similarly, since fertility rates vary with the
educational levels, the policies adopted with respect to maternity benefits also have
some impact on the rates of return. These two factors are of the same order of
magnitude, but they are not as significant as the Mincerian coefficients and labour
income taxes. The numerical values of the elasticities also show that the returns to
education are sensitive mostly to the factors affecting the Mincerian component of
the rates of return: tax rates and wage policies adopted in the public sector.
We conclude by pointing out some of the limits of our analysis. First, differences in
the actual policies and benefits adopted in each country are only imperfectly cap-
tured by the available data provided by international institutions. This is clearly es-
tablished by some of the country studies mentioned above. Secondly, there is an
unavoidable degree of arbitrariness in computing benefits for a given type of worker.
In the paper, we spell out the exact criteria used to select and attribute benefits.
Generally speaking, the conventions adopted may lead us to overestimate the fe-
male returns on education. Therefore, our estimates essentially provide an upper
boundary for the set of ’reasonable’ estimates. Thirdly, we ignore any form of gen-
eral equilibrium consideration. In de la Fuente (2003), the rates of return are defined
as the discount rates such that the actual, average level of schooling is the optimal
solution to the individual decision problem. Accordingly, the elasticity of the rate of
return with respect to, say, unemployment benefits is computed keeping the ’opti-
mal’ investment in education fixed. Hence, it provides us with an intuitive measure of
the relevance of unemployment benefits in determining the rate of return, but it says
nothing about the actual effect on the equilibrium of a change in the benefits.
The set up of the paper is the following. The next section presents the model
adopted for men, which also forms the basis of that we adopt to evaluate the returns
for women. The third section discusses the data and presents our estimates of the
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Mincerian coefficients. In Section 4, we define the additional variables used to cali-
brate the model, we compute the values, by gender, of the private returns on educa-
tion. In Section 5, we analyse the impact of several public policies and compute the
elasticities of the rates of return with respect to these. Technical details on the deri-
vations of the fundamental formulae are given in the appendices.
2 Description of the model
For computing the rates of return on education, we follow the approach proposed by
de la Fuente (2003). The structure of his model has the advantage of considering
opportunity and direct costs, tax system, employment probability and other variables
that can affect the decision of investing in education. Therefore, it allows us to com-
pare how these variables affect individuals in different countries covered in the sam-
ple.
Our estimates of the male returns are based exactly on de la Fuente’s model. In the
estimates for women, the same basic approach will be modified to take into account
maternity leave and benefits.
Let us start with the basic model. Consider an individual who studies for S years
and retires at time U . Let 0S be the average number of years spent in education.
Earnings of a full-time worker with S years of schooling are given by the product of
an increasing function of education, )(Sf , and an exogenous ‘technical efficiency
index’, .0
gt
t eAA  Following de la Fuente, we assume that after-tax earnings of an
individual in full-time employment are given by ,))](()([ tASfTSf  i.e. that “tax
rates are a function of relative rather than absolute incomes”.
If unemployed, individuals obtain net benefits that may or may not be related to their
previous earnings and to average earnings,
))](()([))](()([ 00 SfTSfbSfTSfa  .
Let )(Sp be the probability of being employed for an agent with S years of school-
ing, an increasing function of S . Then, the discounted lifetime earnings of a male,
),(SIM are given by
 
     
dteA
SfTSfbtfTtfatp
tfTtftp
SI rtt
U
SM









  )(()()()())((1
)(()()(
)(
00
Schooling implies direct private costs, denoted by )(SCM (estimated, per year, as a
fixed fraction s of the average earnings of a production worker with 0S years of
schooling). Hence, the (discounted) direct costs of education, ),(SCM are given by
.)()( 00 dteASfSC
rt
ts
S
M

 
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Finally, we assume that, while in school, individuals devote a fixed fraction  of their
time to studying and attending school. Therefore, their labour supply is given by a
fraction )(1  of the labour supply of full-time workers. Moreover, we assume that
students are not entitled to unemployment benefits and that their probability of being
employed is a fixed fraction,  , of that of someone available for full-time work.
Hence, the present value of the expected lifetime earnings while in school,2 ),(SJ M
is given by
      dteAtfTtftpSJ rtt
S
M
  )(1)(1)()( 0 
The present value of the expected net lifetime earnings for men is then
)()()(=)( SCSJSISV MMMM 
We define as private rate of return on education the value r such that the average
level of education 0S is the optimal solution to the problem of maximising )(SVM for
the representative (male) agent. Hence, r is obtained as the value such that
0.=|)(
0S
M
S
SV


Let us define
)(
|)(
)(
|)(
)(
0
0
0
0
00 Sp
S
Sp
Sf
S
Sf
Spp
SS




 
 
)()(1
))()((1|)(
)(
))((
0
0
0
0
0
0 Sf
SfT
S
SfTT
Sf
SfT
sS
'









where  is the Mincerian return to schooling parameter,  measures the curvature
of the function )(Sp at ,0S normalised by ),( 0Sp 0 and T' are the average and
marginal rates of income tax for a full-time worker with education ,0S while s is the
average tax rate on the income of a student with education 0S working part-time.
Finally, let  grR  and H   .0SU 
Using this notation and by a straightforward manipulation of 0,=|
)(
0S
M
S
SV


we
obtain3
2 Note that we ignore retirement benefits.
3 That is, equation (9) in de la Fuente (2003, p.13).
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We will use (1) to evaluate the private rates of return on education for males. Since
the left-hand side of eq. (1) is strictly increasing in MR , the larger the value of the
right-hand side, the larger the value of MR . As specified in the following sections,
we will use the values of the parameters referring to the male population to compute
MR . The main departure from de la Fuente (2003) is that he considers a single
male with earnings equal to those of an Average Production Worker (in the sequel,
APW). We consider instead a couple with two children where the male has earnings
equal to 100% of the Average Worker Wage4 (AWW), while the female has earning
equal to 67% of the AWW. Evidently, marginal and average tax rates ( 0 and
'T ),
as well as unemployment benefits, are adjusted accordingly.
For female individuals, we modify the basic function )(SV as follows. Direct private
education costs and earnings while in school are determined as above. However,
given that female average earnings are estimated at 67% of the AWW, the parame-
ter defining direct private costs of education as a fraction of the female earnings is
s1.5 , so that the actual monetary costs are gender-invariant. Therefore,
dteASfSC rtts
S
W

 )(1.5)( 00 
and
      .)(1()(1)()(
0
dteAtfTtftpSJ rtt
S
W
  
The key difference is in the definition of the expected lifetime earnings after school.
We explicitly introduce in the function )(SIW maternity and parental leave and child
benefits as follows: let )(Sq be the fraction of the (full-time) working life (of length
H ) when the representative woman does not have maternity leave. Evidently,
))((1 Sq will depend upon the number of children, c , divided by the number of
women, W , and upon the length of (paid or unpaid) maternity leave allowed by law,
d , i.e.
4 Up until 2004, the OECD reported the APW in its annual series Taxing Wages. Starting with
the 2005 edition, the APW was replaced by the AWW. Compared to the APW, the AWW is
based on a broader set of sectors, also including service sectors (but not agriculture, the
public sector, education or health services). For more details on the calculation of the APW
and AWW, see OECD (2005).
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During a fraction )(Sq of her active life, a female member of the labour force will be
employed with probability )(Sp , unemployed with probability ))((1 Sp . For this
fraction of her active life, expected earnings are defined exactly as above.
During a fraction  )(1 Sq of her active life, a female member of the labour force
can, legally, be on maternity leave. During this period, she can be either employed
(with probability )(Sp ) or unemployed. If employed, we assume that a woman will
actually take leave of the maximum allowed length. In this period, she will receive a
fraction  of her previous earning, plus other benefits related to child care and typi-
cally independent of personal income and depending instead on average income.
This second component will be denoted as   )(()( 00 SfTSf  . If unemployed,
obviously, she will not take maternity leave. Her income will be determined by the
usual unemployment benefits, ))],(()([))](()([ 00 SfTSfbSfTSfa  plus the
maternity-related benefits (which are, however, independent of employment)
  .)()( 00 SfTSf  Hence, we have:
             tfTtftptqSI
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 })]00
As above, the rate of return on education is the value of r such that 0S is the opti-
mal solution to the problem maximise ).(SVW
Using the notation introduced above, setting ),(= 00 Sqq
0
0
|)(
=
q
S
Sq
S


 , and
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0S we obtain
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For the derivation of eq. (2), see Appendix A. Clearly, when 1=)( 0Sq , (2) reduces
to (1).
Equations (1) and (2) may be given a very similar interpretation: In both equations,
the denominator can be seen as the sum of the marginal opportunity and direct
costs of education, expressed as a share of the after-tax instantaneous earnings at
0S ,   .)()( 00 SfTSf 
Similarly, the numerator gives the marginal effect of education on earnings, once
again expressed as a fraction of the after-tax instantaneous earnings at .0S In (1) ,
this effect can be decomposed into two components: one related to the Mincerian
parameter  and a second one related to the effect of S on the probability of em-
ployment. In the case of women, there is a third component, due to the effect of
education on fertility, captured by the parameter . The ’weight’ of  can be inter-
preted as the marginal increase of income (as a share of expected after-tax earn-
ings) due to the change of the fertility rate induced by an increase in the level of
education. The ‘weight’ of  measures the marginal (percentage) effect of the in-
crease in education on income due to the change in the probability of employment.
Similarly, the ’weight’ of  measures the effect on after-tax incomes due to the ef-
fects that an increase in education has on the earning function )(Sf .
Regarding the  's weight, a relevant role is played by the tax system: the more pro-
gressive the tax system, the lower the value of ,1
1
0
 'T
and the lower the impact of
 on the rates of return. The second term in square brackets, is a (normalised)
measure of the contribution on private returns of the net Mincerian coefficient and it
depends on the probability of being employed and on the unemployment benefit
related to the previous individual wage when unemployed: the higher the probability
of being employed, the higher the term in square brackets (given that 1<a ); also,
the higher a , the higher the weight.
In eq. (2), the interpretation is basically the same. Here, the weight also depends on
the benefit  that a woman obtains if she is out of work because she is on maternity
leave.
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The most instructive way to look at the second component of the numerator, i.e. 
and its weight, is as the product of the derivative of being employed ( 0p )
weighted by the net income gain of being employed. We can interpret the last term
in brackets, in a similar way, once we take into account that
0
0
|)(
=
q
S
Sq
S



.
3 Estimation of the Mincerian coefficients
The main ingredient for evaluating the returns on education is the estimation of the
effect of education on the wage profile. The standard approach has been developed
building on Mincer (1974). There is a huge literature on Mincerian wage equation.
For an overview of single- and multi-country studies and stylised facts, see Peracchi
(2006), Budria and Pereira (2005), Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), Martins
and Pereira (2004), Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001), Harmon,
Oosterbeek and Walker (2003), Card (1999).
In a multi-country analysis, the most relevant difficulty is the comparability of the
data. We provide a direct estimate of the Mincerian coefficients for 12 West Euro-
pean countries using a large European micro-dataset, the EU-SILC data for the year
2007 (revision 2).5 The dataset is a voluntary survey of households coordinated by
Eurostat. The sampling procedure is based “on a nationally representative probabil-
ity sample of the population residing in private households”.6 Starting in 2004, the
EU-SILC data have been collected annually by the national statistical offices for the
purpose of providing comparable information7 on income and the poverty situation in
EU member countries. In most of the countries, the data are gathered using surveys
only, whereas in some countries additional information is drawn from administrative
sources. EU-SILC data have replaced the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) used in a large number of studies (Prieto-Rodriguez, Barros and Vieira
(2008), Middendorf (2008), Heinrich and Hildebrand (2005)). Most of the multi-
country studies on education combined ECHP data with other sources. For instance,
considering two recent papers, Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2009), limiting the
analysis to tertiary education, emphasise differences in the wage premium in 21
OECD countries combining data taken from six different panel data studies.
5 The second revision of the data for the year 2007 was available in 2010. Possibly, during
2011, there will be a third revision of the same dataset. To check the sensitivity of the
data, we have run the regressions for the 12 European countries with both the first and
second revision of the data for 2007. The Mincerian coefficients do not change.
6 See European Commission/Eurostat (2007), EU-SILC User Database Description, version
2007, p. 22. available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/dsis/eusilc/library.
7 The same questionnaire is used in all the countries included in the survey.
IAB-Discussion Paper 20/2011 14
Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009), pooling data from three different sources, study
the effect of quantity of education on wage distribution in 12 European countries.
Compared to other datasets, the EU-SILC provides the opportunity to use very re-
cent and most comparable micro-data to estimate the cross-country difference in
returns on education.8 To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have used the
EU-SILC dataset to analyse the returns to education in Europe. Biagetti and Scicchi-
tano (2009) use the 2007 dataset, considering only the male population in eight
countries. They apply a quantile regression estimation to analyse the link between
education and wage inequality. Davia, McGuinness and O’Connell (2009) use the
EU-SILC data 2005-2006 for seven European countries to explain cross-country
differences in the rates of return in terms of variations in ’relative risk’. They estimate
the Mincerian coefficients for different ISCED levels by gender, also accounting for
selection bias (for the female population). Their main conclusion is that “risk explains
variation of rate of returns in particular at ISCED 5 level”.
The EU-SILC data contain cross-sectional information about households’ financial
behaviour and fundamental individual socio-demographic characteristics such as
age, gender, highest completed degree, parents’ backgrounds, family composition,
working status, etc. On the basis of the availability and comparability of the data, we
have selected 12 countries with different welfare regimes and institutions. We re-
strict the sample to men and women aged 25-64, for whom information about their
earnings is available.
A methodological problem arises when estimating the schooling coefficients due to
the possibility of non-random selection of the sample from the workforce (Heckman
(1979, 1980), Hoffmann and Kassouf (2005)). A priori, we can assume that the rele-
vance of this problem varies across genders. Hence, given the aim of our study, it is
particularly important to take into account this possible bias. We estimate the wage
equation using the selection model by Heckman to control for potential selection
bias into employment.
Given a sample of individuals, denoted by the subscript i , observed at time t , we
proceed to estimate the econometric model (outcome equation)
iiiiiiiiii uPTPSMarForxxSw 
^
76543
2
210=)(log 
where iw is a measure of earnings for individual i , iS is a measure of his/her
schooling while ix measures work experience. Experience is included as a quad-
ratic term to capture the concavity of the earning profile. We also include several
dummy variables to control for nationality, marital status, public sector and part-time
8 For a discussion on the quality of the data, see Schneider and Muller (2009).
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job. As usual, i
^
 is the inverse Mills ratio, estimated from the first stage, and iu is a
disturbance term representing other explanatory variables. The Heckman selection
equation is as follows:
iiiiiiiiii eFIncOChYChMarForxxSz  87654
2
3210=)( 
where iYCh is the number of young children, aged 0-5, while iOCh is the number of
older children, aged 6-17, in the household. iFInc is a measure of the income of the
other members of the family. In our case it is the total household income minus own
labour income. Finally, ie is a zero mean error term.9
The schooling coefficient  in the wage equation can be interpreted as the wage
premium. This coefficient is then used as an input in the computation of the internal
rate of return of investment in education, i.e. to calibrate the model.
There are additional problems related to the data used in the estimation, in particu-
lar, the measures of earning, schooling and experience. Before moving to the de-
tailed presentation of our estimates, let us discuss these issues. In the EU-SILC
data, gross wages are reported on an annual basis for most of the countries and as
gross monthly earnings for Italy and Portugal. We use the information available to
compute the log of hourly wages, the dependent variable in our wage regressions.
With regard to the educational background of respondents, the highest ISCED level
attained is reported, as well as the year when it was attained. Combining these vari-
ables, we derive the standard measure of schooling attainment, the number of years
of education.10
To measure the work experience we used the actual experience,11 available for
most of the countries.12 In the following table, we report only the estimated values of
the coefficients of schooling and of  . Estimates of the coefficient of other explana-
tory variables are available upon request.
9 The two errors terms, ie and iu , are jointly (bivariate) normally distributed.
10 For Denmark and Sweden, the year when the highest level was attained is not available.
For these two countries, we compute the average number of years needed to attain each
ISCED level, considering the typical graduation ages (OECD, Education at a Glance
2009) minus six.
11 This is reported by respondents as “number of years spent in paid employment”.
12 Again, this does not apply to Denmark and Sweden. For them, we computed the potential
experience as the age of the individual, minus the years of education, plus six.
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Table 1: Mincerian coefficients, by gender
Gender
Country Male Female
M M MN W W WN
Austria 0.0495*** -0.7837*** 2,953 0.0614*** 0.2394*** 3,384
(0.0283) (0.0348) (0.0037) (0.0382)
Belgium 0.0443*** 0.1083*** 2,790 0.0531*** 0.0970** 3,415
(0.0024) (0.0269) (0.0033) (0.0478)
Denmark 0.0446*** 0.1064*** 2,998 0.0508*** -0.0035 2,918
(0.0026) (0.0285) (0.0025) (0.0345)
France 0.0462*** 0.0520** 4,490 0.0484*** 0.0872*** 5,214
(0.0021) (0.0316) (0.0023) (0.0282)
Germany 0.0461*** 0.0180 5,596 0.0449*** 0.0618** 7,081
(0.0017) (0.0232) (0.0022) (0.0311)
Ireland 0.0569*** 0.1993*** 2,305 0.0859*** 0.4167* 3,312
(0.0036) (0.0647) (0.0042) (0.3170)
Italy 0.0363*** 0.0633*** 10,724 0.0406*** 0.1426*** 12,798
(0.0010) (0.0179) (0.0015) (0.0234)
Luxembourg 0.0827*** 0.1061** 2,034 0.0842*** 0.2216*** 2,409
(0.0022) (0.0464) (0.0037) (0.0570)
Netherlands 0.0404*** 0.0288 5,467 0.0286*** -0.0466*** 6,130
(0.0021) (0.0464) (0.0028) (0.0438)
Portugal 0.0727*** 0.4410*** 2,179 0.0940*** 0.4920*** 2,683
(0.0034) (0.0340) (0.0033) (0.0275)
Spain 0.0577*** 0.2067*** 6,610 0.0705*** 0.2231*** 8,743
(0.0022) (0.0322) (0.0039) (0.0417)
Sweden 0.0543*** 0.0308 3,882 0.0342*** -0.3555*** 3,816
(0.0038) (0.0392) (0.0042) (0.0417)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;***significant at 1%.
In line with the previous literature, the values of W are equal to or larger than those
of M . Relevant (and positive) differences are observed in Ireland, Portugal and
Spain. The only countries where W is lower than M are Sweden, the Netherlands
and Germany, where the difference is not relevant.
In Sweden, the public sector is a very relevant component of GDP and there is
higher percentage of skilled women, compared to skilled men, working in this sector.
Also, our estimates show that the wage level is typically lower in the public sector.
Therefore, differences by gender of the skill composition of workers in public em-
ployment can explain the gender gap in the schooling coefficients.
The female job market in the Netherlands is characterised by a high proportion of
women in the labour force working part-time. This proportion is even higher among
low-skilled women and working mothers. Our estimation strategy does not allow us
to fully capture the impact of part-time jobs by skill levels. In a separate regression,
not reported in the text, we combine educational levels (ISCED levels) and part-time
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experience. The values of the coefficients are decreasing for education. This sug-
gests that the high incidence of part-time jobs may play a role in explaining the lower
rates of return for females as compared to the male population.
For Germany, our estimation is in line with the results in the literature (Gebel and
Pfeiffer (2010)). In this country, the occupational segregation by gender, in particular
in the low-wage sectors, is a well-known and widely discussed phenomenon. As
pointed out by Achatz et al. (2005), only one third of the gender gap in Germany can
be explained by differences in human capital. It seems to be more important that
wages in female-dominated job cells are typically lower than in male-dominated
cells, where a job cell consists of a worker in the same occupation within the same
firm. (Basically, this concept allows them to purge the results of unobserved hetero-
geneity due to firm-specific factors.) The findings of Achatz et al. can be taken as
evidence of the importance of the sorting of females into female-specific jobs and,
thus, gender-specific occupational segregation. Segregation makes it difficult for
highly skilled women to obtain jobs in the upper part of the occupational hierarchy
(see also Achatz (2008)). Moreover, there is evidence that, if they do obtain such
jobs, they no longer suffer wage discrimination (Bush and Holst (2011)), but that the
’glass ceiling’ effect makes it hard to secure these jobs. Clearly, this phenomenon
has an impact on the Mincerian coefficient of the female population.
4 Calibration of the model and main results
In this section, we present our estimates, by gender, of the private returns on educa-
tion. They are computed calibrating equations (1) and (2) above, using macro-data.
The only exception is for the schooling coefficients, where we use our estimations of
the Mincerian coefficients.
For each country, we consider a representative married couple with two children. de
la Fuente (2003) takes, instead, a single individual with a wage equal to 100% of the
APW. We do not refer to single parents because, in most of the countries consid-
ered, most women are married at the time of child-bearing. We assume that male
earnings are equal to 100% of AWW, while female earnings are 67% of AWW. This
is a fairly realistic assumption, if we take into account the actual average earnings in
manufacturing for women and men in the European countries (OECD (2009).
We assume that, after schooling, agents are in the labour force until the average
age of retirement. We also assume that they want to work 20% of a standard work
year while studying. The computations also consider taxes on labour income and
unemployment benefits. In particular, for women, we include general government
child cash benefits (but not tax expenditures, i.e. tax allowances or tax credits) and
benefits related to maternity and childcare provided to working women. In the se-
quel, when convenient, we will use the subscripts W and M to denote the values
of the parameters for women and men, respectively.
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To compute the expected length of working life, MH and WH , we subtract the
maximum value between the country average years of schooling plus six and 15
(the minimum age to legally enter the labour market) from the average ages of re-
tirement, MU and WU . Data are taken from the Eurostat LFS database and refers
to 2007 for all the countries but Ireland (2006) and Luxembourg (2003).
One of the motivations for the study of private returns by gender is a result of the
large differences in the gender-specific rates of unemployment. As we have seen,
rates of unemployment enter equations (1) and (2) because they help determine the
weights of  , and  . Therefore, significant differences in the rate of unemploy-
ment by gender and by country could determine differences in the rates of return.
Indeed, in most of the countries, female rates of unemployment are higher. The
negative relationship between unemployment and level of education – or positive
relationship between employment and level of education – is widely studied in the
economic literature. Our data confirm that, independently of gender, an increase in
the level of education has a positive effect on the probability of employment.
To allow for an easier comparison of the results, in equations (1) and (2), the effect
of education on the probability of employment is measured by
0p
p'
 , where
))((1)( SuSp  and )(Su is the rate of unemployment for individuals with a level
of education S . The Eurostat LFS database provides the gender-specific rates of
unemployment in 2007 for three different levels of education. It is then possible to
approximate the average increase in probability of employment,  0Sp
' . First, we
consider the marginal increment of the probability for each level of education divided
by the cumulate years of schooling associated with the attainment levels )(nS (see
de la Fuente and Doménech (2006)), using the following equation for 1,2=n :
)(1)(
)(1)(
)( =
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n SS
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c

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where 1 denotes below upper secondary education, 2 upper secondary education
and 3 tertiary education. Then, we compute  Sp' as the weighted average of the
two increments with weights of 2/3 for (1)c and 1/3 for (2)c . Finally,  is obtained as
 
 
.
3
2
Sp
Sp'
The correction factor, 2/3, is used to capture the fact that the probability of
employment depends on many other factors other than education.
During the years of schooling, the probability of being employed is, in general, lower.
To capture this effect, we correct the probability of being employed while in school
using a factor that we denote M for males and W for females. We compute these
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factors using the unemployment rates, by gender, of the young population in educa-
tion and not in education. We assume that, while in school, individuals devote a
fixed fraction , 8.0 , of their time to studying. The data are taken from Education
at a Glance (OECD (2009)) and refer to 2007.
The tax system is extremely important and it affects the private returns on education
in many different ways. Given the focus of our analysis and the basic features of the
family structure in the European countries considered, we introduce two different
types of tax payers in the analysis. We assume that, while in school, individuals are
taxed as single (OECD (2009)). After school, they are taxed as members of a family
consisting of two working parents and two children. Indeed, in most countries, mar-
ginal tax rates, T' , are different for the two types of tax payers. In all the countries,
the average income tax rates, 0 , are lower for a family with two children than for a
single person. The data refer to 2007 (OECD (2008)13). We use this date to calcu-
late the private returns independently of gender. (However, effective tax rates may
vary across gender because the individual incomes of men and women are different,
by assumption).
Concerning benefits, the analysis is more complex. In our model, we consider two
different categories of benefits: the first refers to unemployment. The second is re-
lated to maternity and is, normally gender specific. Unemployment benefits are
computed as the sum of two components. One captures the benefits related to pre-
vious net earnings )(a , while the second captures benefits that are assumed to be
related to average net earnings )(b . The net (i.e. after-tax) replacement rates
 ba  are different for different types of family (single person, married couple, cou-
ple with two children, single parent with two children). Also, we assume that the dis-
tribution is gender-independent. The values of )(a and )(b for men and women are
different because of the assumption of different earnings as a percentage of AWW.
The net replacement rates vary greatly across countries14 and are best seen as no
more than an approximation of the actual benefit systems.15 The data are from the
OECD (2007).
13 Bear in mind that OECD data define the marginal tax rate as the rate applied to an in-
crease in the income of the main earner, here, by assumption, the husband. Evidently, the
actual marginal tax rates on women's wages may be lower (because we are assuming
that their wages are lower). This may induce an underestimation of the actual returns to
education for women.
14 n some countries, there are only benefits proportional to previous earning (this implies that
b=0), in other countries they are fixed (a=0) and in still others they are mixed: some of the
unemployed have a fixed subsidy, while others receive benefits related to their previous
earnings (MIX, a≠0,b≠0). 
15 This is confirmed for Belgium. For this country, a more detailed analysis (see de la Croix
and Vanderberghe (2004)) estimates a net replacement rate of 34%, which is much lower
than the 66% used in de la Fuente and 71% used here. The OECD data are, however, the
best available for a comparative analysis.
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The second kind of benefits is related to maternity. In this case, we must take into
account the position of the individual woman in the labour market. In all the Euro-
pean countries, in order to reconcile women’s family life and work, the law estab-
lishes the right for a working woman to leave her job for a period of time for mater-
nity and child care. A fraction of this period is paid (by the firms or by the public in-
surance system; this difference is irrelevant to the aim of this study). We consider
the amounts of money that women receive during this time (i.e. maternity, childcare
and parental leave due to maternity) as a ’benefit’ ,  , that they can obtain if they
work and have a child (OECD (2007)). Moreover, for all women who have a child,
independently of their position in the labour market, the government normally pays
cash benefits,  . The child benefit programmes also differ dramatically in the 12
countries (OECD (2007), MISSOC (2007), ISSA (2006-2007)). These policies may
have a relevant impact on the labour market. In general, it is shown that the first kind
of benefits tend to increase the participation rate for women, while the second has a
negative effect on it because it increases the opportunity cost of work and, therefore,
the reservation wage of women. All our calculations related to both kinds of benefits
are available upon request.
As explained above, the negative relationship between fertility rates and education
is an important component of our analysis. The existence of a negative relationship
is confirmed for most countries, with average fertility rates of 1.50%, 1.23% and
1.08%, respectively, for low, medium and high levels of education. To evaluate if
and how this affects the private returns on education of women, we introduce a new
variable )(Sq , defined as the fraction of the (full-time) working life when the repre-
sentative woman does not have maternity leave. Then, ))((1 Sq is the fraction of
her active life which can be spent on maternity leave (we can think of this as the
time immediately before and after the birth of her children). This variable, ),(Sq is
an increasing function of S and equal to:







H
dS
W
cSq )(1=)(
where the fertility rate )(S
W
c
( c is the number of children, W is the number of
women in fertility age) is a decreasing function of schooling. We multiply the aver-
age number of children per woman by the fraction of the working life a woman can
spend caring (full time) for each child, H
d
, to measure the time women spend off
work on average in each country for maternity-related reasons. The data used to
compute the length of maternity leave, measured in years, for each country are
taken from OECD (2007).
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The marginal effect of education on fertility is captured by the parameter
0
=
q
q'
 .
To estimate this, we use the same methodology adopted to estimate the sensitivity
of the probability of employment. As mentioned above, the EU-SILC data do not
provide information to compute the fertility rates directly. The most recent and com-
parable data we have found to calculate them are in UNCE (different years) and
refer to women aged 20-49 (for some countries, the age groups are different). For
Denmark, these data are unavailable and so we use a different source which pro-
vides fertility rates by education in 1979 (Jones (1982)). Considering the European
countries for which fertility rates by education are available from both sources
(Finland, France, Italy and Spain), one can see that they have decreased by about
33% over the last two decades. To take into account the general tendency of fertility
rates to decrease during this period, we multiply the value of 1979 by 2/3 in order to
correct the original estimates. In Table 2, we present the fertility rates by levels of
education, maternity leave and childcare benefits.
Table 2: Fertility rates by education levels, d,  and 
Fertility rates, by education
Leave
periodb
Mat. leave
benefitsc
Child care
benefits
Country Low Medium High d  %  %
Austria 1.10 1.10 1.10 2.15 29 16
Belgium 1.39 1.08 1.09 0.52 51 16
Denmarka 1.47 1.47 1.24 0.96 100 11
France 1.88 1.38 1.10 3.06 30 7
Germany 1.25 1.05 1.07 3.12 30 21
Irelanda 1.48 1.43 1.18 0.92 38 18
Italy 1.52 1.07 0.88 0.90 51 0
Luxembourg 1.39 1.08 1.09 0.77 70 40
Netherlands 1.38 1.17 0.76 0.31 100 7
Portugal 1.71 1.07 1.11 0.33 100 0
Spain 1.65 1.16 1.00 3.12 10 0
Sweden 1.80 1.46 1.26 1.62 74 12
Source: UNCE, a. Jones (1982)
b. Total leave in years (maternity, parental, childcare).
c. Maternity leave benefits as a % of women’s earnings, 67% of the AWW.
As standard in the literature, we define the direct private costs of schooling s as a
fraction of AWW gross earnings. It is computed as the weighted average of secon-
dary and tertiary levels by 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. The costs are net costs of direct
public subsidies to students and, therefore, s can have a negative value when
these subsidies exceed tuition and other direct costs. For men, we use the data from
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OECD (2009).16 For women, given that female average earnings are estimated at
67% of the AWW, the parameter defining direct private costs of education as a frac-
tion of the female earning is s1.5 , so that the actual monetary costs are the same.
Further explanations of the data and of the details of the computations are available
upon request.
On the basis of the above, we are able to explicitly compute (numerically) the values
Wr and Mr , using the estimates described to compute the right-hand side of equa-
tions (1) and (2). Table 3 reports the private rates of return on education by gender
for 12 West European countries and the numerical values of the main components
of the numerators and denominators of equations (1) and (2). For most (to be pre-
cise, 9 out of 12) of the countries, Wr is larger than Mr . Let us first focus on men.
For them, private returns range, for most countries, between 4% and 6%, with an
average of 5.7%. The minimum value, 3.9%, is in Italy, while the maximum is 8.6%
in Luxembourg. To interpret the table, see eq. (1) in Section 2, where the numerator
represents the marginal gain due to an increase in schooling, while the denominator
measures the marginal net costs.
16 Values for tertiary expenditure are missing for Denmark and Luxembourg. For these coun-
tries, following a common procedure, the values from Sweden and Belgium are assigned,
respectively.
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Table 3: Returns to education, by components
Country Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland
Male
Minc comp 0.03716 0.03096 0.04074 0.04183 0.03841 0.04618
Empl comp 0.00089 0.00150 0.00020 0.00084 0.00133 0.00107
Opp cost 0.78216 0.77095 0.78752 0.81402 0.79648 0.78951
Direct cost 0.07455 0.00098 -0.02673 0.01880 0.04239 0.01703
Mr % 5.00 4.64 6.10 5.75 5.32 6.81
Female
Minc comp 0.04550 0.03599 0.04553 0.04347 0.03659 0.06903
Empl comp 0.00035 0.00126 0.00011 0.00029 0.00015 0.00046
Fert. comp 0 0.00009 -0.00003 0.00264 0.00055 0.00014
Opp cost 0.77071 0.77806 0.79112 0.79990 0.78070 0.78351
Direct cost 0.11613 0.00147 -0.03975 0.03040 0.06592 0.02580
Wr % 5.81 5.47 6.88 6.36 4.82 9.92
Country Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden
Male
Minc comp 0.02891 0.06215 0.03335 0.05902 0.04650 0.03459
Empl comp 0.00031 0.00011 0.00020 0.00006 0.00024 0.00050
Opp cost 0.78748 0.81620 0.80423 0.80629 0.79872 0.80829
Direct cost 0.01783 0.00074 0.02887 0.06939 0.05050 -0.03739
Mr % 3.88 8.63 4.57 7.90 6.41 5.23
Female
Minc comp 0.03234 0.06252 0.02365 0.07637 0.05678 0.02126
Empl comp 0.00040 0.00009 0.00032 0.00015 0.00015 0.00040
Fert. Comp. 0.00047 -0.00006 -0.00001 0 0.00304 0.00018
Opp cost 0.78577 0.81328 0.80692 0.81267 0.79773 0.80415
Direct cost 0.02710 0.00111 0.04331 0.10436 0.08135 -0.05619
Wr % 4.48 8.68 2.72 9.67 7.97 2.76
Source: own calculations based on EU-SILC (2007)
In general, the key component of marginal costs are opportunity costs. In only three
countries (Austria, Portugal and Spain), direct costs exceed 5% of instantaneous net
earnings. Given that a negative value of direct costs implies government subsidies
in excess of private costs, in some countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, subsi-
dies are particularly generous. On the other hand, opportunity costs are (at the mar-
gin) always above 77% of net earnings.
Similarly, if we consider the composition of the numerator, we can say that the main
component of the payoffs depends on the coefficient of the Mincerian equation,
while the effects of education on the probability of employment is of a smaller order
of magnitude.
Let us now consider the figures for women in particular. For most of the countries,
the private returns of women lie between 6% and 7%, with an average of 6.02%.
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They are much lower than the average in Sweden (2.8%) and in the Netherlands
(2.7%). For Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal, the rates are much higher than aver-
age: 9.9%. 9.7% and 8.7%, respectively.
As in the case of men, by and large, the most important component of costs are
opportunity costs (even if, due to the lower net earnings, direct costs are somewhat
more relevant).
Comparing the weights of the components of the numerator, we can see that the
effects of  and  are quite low. The most important component of the numerator
is, as before, related to the coefficient of the Mincerian equation.
The effects of education on the probability of employment and fertility vary greatly
across countries, also depending on the policy parameters. While it is usually
smaller, the fertility effect is of the same order as the employment effect. However,
we can conclude that the coefficients  and the associated weights, measuring the
impact of taxes on labour income, drive the decision of the agents. To better under-
stand the role of these components in determining the returns, we decompose and
compare each part of the weights and their distributions (modulo a normalisation).
Looking at mean values and variances across countries, not reported in the text, we
conclude that while the distribution of the weights of  does not vary much across
genders, the distribution of the weights of  is quite different, with a lower mean and
higher variance for the female population, due to the large differences in the public
polices related to unemployment benefits and maternity leave benefits.
5 Elasticities
The maternity-related policy parameters ( and  ) vary across countries. There-
fore, it is natural to ask what the effect of changes in these is on female rates of re-
turns. Increases in the values of  and  have a direct effect on the rate of return
R because they decrease the opportunity cost of maternity. There is also an indi-
rect effect because changes in  and  affect the fertility rate and may influence
the values of )( 0Sq and )( 0Sp . Here, we will only consider the (presumably larger)
direct effects. The indirect effects depend, among other parameters, on the second
derivatives of )(Sq and )(Sp . Unfortunately, the available data do not allow for any
reasonable conjecture on their values.
To compute the effects of changes in (  , ) on RW , rewrite eq. (2) as
0.=),()( GRF W  Then, by the implicit function theorem,
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We must bear in mind that the two derivatives measure the rates of change of WR
due to changes in  and  , under the assumption that the optimal level of school-
ing is invariant, because, by construction, in this model, the optimal value of S is
given (and equal to the country average level) while the rate of discount is treated as
an endogenous variable. Also, we abstract from the possible effects on equilibrium
wages. Therefore, these elasticities must be interpreted simply as a measure of the
relevance of these policy parameters in determining Mr and Wr .
Both derivatives have an undefined sign. For the second one, if q' is positive (or
negative but sufficiently small), the sign is negative, as one would expect, because
increases in  in turn increase the opportunity cost of schooling and, since 0S is
given (individuals cannot change the level of education chosen), the rate of return
decreases, in order to guarantees that 0S persists as the optimal choice for the indi-
vidual. In the sequel, while discussing our estimates, we will see that, for the sample
of countries considered here, the estimated values of

 wR are, indeed, always
negative.
It turns out that the first derivative is also always negative. This is somewhat coun-
terintuitive because an increase in the value of  increases the expected future in-
come. However, it also increases the opportunity costs of schooling. The impact of a
change in  on the opportunity costs dominates all the others. Numerically, in most
of the countries, the values of q' and of  are fairly small. This is also possibly due
to the postulated time independence of the variables.
Following the same approach, we estimate the elasticities of MR and WR with re-
spect to the unemployment benefit parameters, marginal and average tax rates.
Direct computation of the elaticities, by gender, is reported in Appendices B.1 and
B.2. The numerical values are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4: Elasticities of PRR
Country Unemployment benefits Marginal tax rate Average tax rate
Maternity
leave
Child care
Male Female Male Female Male Female c c
Austria -0.68 -0.61 -5.93 -6.34 1.96 -5.54 -0.01 -0.09
Belgium -1.07
a
-1.24
a -7.33 -7.91 2.68 3.34 -0.03 -0.03
Denmark -0.31
a
-0.51
a -5.42 -5.88 5.08 10.01 -0.12 -0.05
France -0.64 -0.62 -3.07 -3.15 1.99 0.19 -0.24 -0.13
Germany -1.91 -2.13 -5.33 -5.22 2.30 -3.80 -0.05 -0.20
b
Ireland -0.63
a
-0.92
a -2.78 -5.98 0.00 0.93 -0.07 -0.16
Italy -0.35 -0.33 -3.96 -3.95 0.92 -0.22 -0.10 -
Luxembourg -0.28 -0.28 -6.20 -6.16 2.66 2.01 -0.09 -0.18
Netherlands -0.21 -0.31 -5.01 -5.01 3.65 -3.70 -0.07 -0.01
Portugal -0.23 -0.18 -5.54 -9.18 1.64 -1.95 -0.09 -
Spain -0.33 -0.28 -3.68 -4.80 0.68 -1.08 -0.07 -
Sweden -0.32
a
-0.11
a -6.98 -6.65 2.72 9.84 -0.32 -0.11
a
Replacement rates are based on the average earning of the country.
b
For Germany: Kindergeld.
c
The elasticities with regard to  and  are computed for the female population.
The first two columns report the elasticities of the returns on education for men and
women with respect to the replacement rates. An exogenous increase in unem-
ployment benefits has a negative impact on the returns on education of both gen-
ders. The magnitude of this effects is, however, fairly small. What is much more sig-
nificant is the impact of a change in the tax system, described in the model by the
marginal and average tax rates. According to the theoretical model, (see Appendix
B), the sign of the elasticity with respect to the marginal tax rate is negative for both
genders. The numerical values estimated for all the countries satisfy this prediction.
On the other hand, our model does not deliver a sign restriction for the elasticities
with respect to the average tax rate. This is because, as usual with this approach,
we are taking as given the relevant marginal tax rate (see the details of the model in
Appendices A and B). Hence, an increase in the average tax rate can be interpreted
as a decrease in the progressivity of the tax system. This implies that the sign of the
elasticity can vary according to the position of the individual in the wage distribution.
According to our results, for men the impact of an exogenous increase in the aver-
age tax rate is always positive. For women, the sign changes considerably across
countries. It may be positive or negative. It is positive and significant in countries
where the tax system is more progressive and the relative earnings distributions of
females is fairly close to that for men, such as in Denmark and Sweden.
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6 Conclusion
Our aim was to compare the returns on education of men and women and to ana-
lyse the role and the impact of Mincerian coefficients in the decision of the individual
to invest in education. To this aim, we have embedded the Mincerian coefficients in
the individual decision problem, together with several other parameters capturing
the main characteristic of the labour market and tax system, the costs of the invest-
ment in education, and public policies which also affect the private incentive to in-
vest in education and, therefore, the rate of returns. To compute the gender-specific
returns, we have also explicitly considered several policy variables related to mater-
nity episodes.
Our results confirm that education is an important determinant of individual earnings
for both genders. Private returns on education of females are higher than those of
males in all the countries in the sample but Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.
The gender gap in the returns can be explained mainly by the Mincerian coefficients,
typically larger for women, which more than compensate the negative effects on
women’s rates of return triggered by higher unemployment rates and maternity-
related benefits (always lower than a full wage).
Finally, we have estimated the effects on the rates of returns of some policy pa-
rameters. In this regard, we can conclude that, for both genders, an increase in un-
employment benefits always has a negative impact on the rates of return to educa-
tion. Concerning the tax system, an increase in the marginal tax rates always has a
negative impact on rates of return to education, while an increase in the average tax
rates can have a negative or positive impact on rates of return to education, accord-
ing to the progressivity of the tax system. To understand the effect of both kinds of
child benefits on the private returns, we have numerically computed the elasticities
of WR with respect to  and  , for the 12 countries. In each country, the elasticities
are negative and not high. Hence, an exogenous increase in  and  always im-
plies a weak decrease in women's private returns. While usually smaller, the fertility
effect is of the same order as the employment effect. However, our results strongly
suggest that the Mincerian coefficients,  , and changes in labour income taxes
drive the rates of return of both men and women, while other components are of a
smaller order of magnitude.
As explained above, our estimates are best seen as an upper boundary for the ac-
tual values of the returns. This is for several reasons, related both to the structure of
the model and to the values of the parameters used in the analysis. With respect to
the second issue, we have used the OECD (1999) estimates of the replacement
rates for unemployed individuals. However, independent estimates for Belgium (de
la Croix and Vanderberghe (2004)) suggest that, at least for this country, actual re-
placement rates are substantially lower. Given that unemployment rates for women
are higher, overestimates of replacement rates would have a larger effect on the
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values of Wr than on those of Mr . Given the structure of the model, in our estimates,
we ignore the time-dependence of maternity and unemployment benefits, which
probably induces an overestimate for women. We compute only for women the
share of maternity benefits which are not employment related (measured above by
 ). Given that these benefits are provided to families and not just to female mem-
bers of the labour force, the way we have treated them could have caused some
additional overestimate of female returns as compared to male returns.
Furthermore, as in de la Fuente (2003), we have considered expected lifetime re-
turns. Given that women’s rates of unemployment are higher than those of men,
female incomes are probably more variable over time. This has no effect on our es-
timate of R , but could have effects on the actual well-being of risk-averse individu-
als. Unemployment and maternity-related benefits smooth income over the lifetime
and, of course, their relevance for the individual utility increases with the degree of
risk aversion. However, the differences in the orders of magnitude of the factors
affecting the rates of return on education are such that we do not believe that a main
qualitative conclusion will be affected by introducing an empirical plausible degree of
risk aversion.
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Appendix A: Derivation of equations (1) and (2)
For convenience, in this Appendix, we will omit the subscript W .
The point of departure is given by the first order condition of the optimisation prob-
lem of the representative female agent:
0.=|)(|)(|)(=|)(
0000 SSSS S
SJ
S
SC
S
SI
S
SV










(A.1)
Define
     
 
     
     






















00
)(1
)(
)()(
SfTSfb
SfTSfa
Sp
SfTSfSp
SqSk
 
     
     
 
     
     
     
.
)(1
)(
)(1
00
00
00







































SfTSf
SfTSfb
SfTSfa
Sp
SfTSf
SfTSf
Sp
Sq



Then,
   
R
eeA
S
SkeASk
S
SI RSRU
S
RS
S









0
00
0
000
|)()(=|)(
where, setting )(= 00 Sqq and 'q ,|
)(
0SS
Sq


 
     
     










00
00
00
0 1
))((1(
=|)( SfTSf
bapp
bapp
q
S
Sk '
S 
 
    
     








00
0
0
)(1
)(1
SfTSf
baq
baq
p
'

          .)(1 000000 SfSfTSfappq ''' 
Moreover,
   000000 ))()((1)(1=|
)( RS
S eASfTSfpS
SJ 




and
 .)(1.5=|)( 0000
RS
SS eASfS
SC 



Dividing (A.1) by 00
RSeA  and rearranging terms, we obtain
  ))()((1)(1)(1.5)(
|)(
=
1 00000
0
SfTSfpSfSk
S
Sk
e
R
s
S
RH  


 
DENOM
NUM
 (A.2)
IAB-Discussion Paper 20/2011 30
Simplifying and collecting terms, we can rewrite NUM and DENOM in (A.2) as fol-
lows:
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Appendix B: Elasticities of private returns to education
Let us compute the effects of changes in a ’generic’ policy parameter  on the rate
of return R . Let
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because its numerator is equal to 0 when 0=R and it is easily confirmed to be an
increasing function of R . (Clearly, the denominator is always non-negative.)
We present the direct computation, by gender, in the next two sections of the Ap-
pendix.
B.1: Elasticities of private returns to education for the male
population
Rewrite eq. (1), the FOC from the optimisation problem of a male individual:
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We proceed by computing the derivatives with respect to the different parameters:
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The elasticities with respect to  , for males, are given by:
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where  is any one of the policy parameters introduced above.
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B.2: Elasticities of private returns to education for the female
population
Rewrite eq. (2), the FOC from the optimisation problem of a female individual:
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The derivative with regard to R is, obviously, the same. We proceed by computing
the derivatives with respect to the different parameters:
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As before, the elasticities with respect to  , for females in this case, are given by:
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where  is any one of the policy parameters introduced above.
In the text we only present, in Table 4, the numerical values of the elasticities of the
private returns to education, by gender, with respect to unemployment benefits, a
and b , marginal and average tax rates, 'T and 0 , and maternity leave and child-
care benefits,  and  .
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